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Abstract 
Movements often provide the impetus for counter-movements to mobilize. 
Movement and Counter-movement (M/CM) then engage in loosely coupled conflict 
as each attempts to win support from bystanders and authorities. 
The paper discusses 1) appropriate models on studying M/CM interaction, 
including fights, games, debates and wars; 2) components for comparative 
analysis ; 3) problems of counter-movement mobilization; 4) the battle joined, 
- - 
strategies and tactics of interaction;. 5) the relation of movements.and counter- 
. . 
movements to authorities. Hypotheses are developed. Illustrations are drawn 
for varieties of M/CM interaction and some data from a study of the anti- 
nuclear power/pro-nuclear interaction. 
Movement and Countermovement: Loosely Coupled'Conflict 
, - .  
The growth of the anti-abortion movement, the pro-family movement, the 
anti-busing movement, the rise of Moral Majority, Phyllis Schlafley's Eagle 
Forum, and the victory of Ronald Reagan has spawned a small industry of scho- 
larly and popular writing about conservative and reactionary social movements. 
Quite reasonably, sociologists have joined the parade and we are having a small 
boomlet in studies of conservative countermovements. -(See Useem on the anti- 
busing movement in Boston, Useem and Zald, 1983, on the pro-nuclear power move- 
ment, and Lo, 1982 and Mottl, 1981 for more general treatments.) 
These writings join an earlier body of literature examining right-wing 
movements (for instance, Lipset and Raab, 1970; Daniel Aaron, 1981; Bell, 1964). 
This paper,. too, is motivated by, gains momentum from, our awareness of the growth 
of right-wing movements. But its thrust, its angle of vision, is somewhat 
different. Most students of conservative movements search for their social bases, 
leading organizations, and actors. They do for countermovements what others 
have done for movements. But our interests are more interactional. We are 
interested in how movements generate a countermovement, and how they then engage 
in a loosely coupled tango of mobilization and demobilization. And we are 
interested in how, in the language of McCarthy & Zald (1977;. 1981), the struc- 
ture of the SM industry shapes the tactics and structure of the CM industry. 
Finally, we wish to explore the relationships among movement, countermovement, 
and authority. 
Our central premise is that movements of any visibility and impact create 
the conditions for the mobilization of countermovements. By advocating change, 
by attacking the established interests, by mobilizing symbols and raising costs 
to others, they create grievances and provide opportunities for organizational 
entrepreneurs to define countermovement goals and issues. In the last two 
decades social movement researchers have expanded their analytic and empirical 
frame of reference. We now have a rich set of tools and concepts to be used in 
studying social movements--the social psychology of attitudes and ideology, 
the dimensions and conditions of solidarity, the nature of SMO change, the 
processes of resource mobilization, the analysis of competition and conflict 
among MOs are part of the kit bag of sociology. And recently we have begun to 
examine the interaction of authorities and movements (Tilly, Marx), an im- 
portant and much neglected topic. What is surprising, however, is the neglect 
of the dynamic inter-play of movement and countermovement. Much of a move- 
ment's activity is aimed at neutralizing, confronting, or discrediting its 
corresponding countermovement. Similarly, the countermovement gains its impetus 
and grows from showing the harmful effects of the movement. It attacks the 
movement leaders, bombs its sites of program action, and associates the move- 
ment with evil. It chooses its tactics in response to the structure and tactics 
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of the movement.- 
This paper sketches out the components for the analysis of movement/ 
countermovement (M/CM) interaction. In the first section we situate this 
analysis in the study of social conflict. The key question there is how does 
M/CM analysis differ from the study of any social conflict whatsoever? To 
use Rapoport's (1960) classification, how does it compare with the study of 
fights, games and debates and of wars? Section I1 presents a recipe book for 
describing M/CM location in the social structure and problems of CM mobilization. 
Section IIIdiscusses the battle joined, forms of conflict and interaction. 
1 
-We suspect that the neglect of movement-countermovement interaction is 
related to the difficulties of diachronic, processual and interactional analysis, 
especially when it is appl.ied to such diffuse and changing entities as social 
movements. 
Section IV is devoted to the analysis of the interplay of M/CM and authorities. 
Ms and CMs are locked in a struggle to convince and convert authorities. In 
a complex polity there are a wide variety of M/CM authority relations. Finally, 
the conclusion addresses the place of M/CM interaction in the larger historical 
and cultural setting. 
I. Conflict Theory, Debates, and M/CM Analysis 
Zald and McCarthy define a social movement as the mobilization of senti- 
ments in which people take actions to achieve change in the social structure 
and the allocation of value. A countermovement is the mobilization of senti- 
ments initiated to some degree in opposition to a movement. It follows in 
time a mobilization to change society. Actors identifying with the counter- 
movement orient themselves to the actions of the movement. That is, they see 
themselves as either directly countering the movement or undoing its effects. 
If, however, the original movement's supporters or SMOs have vanished, then 
the new mobilization effort must be considered a movement, not a counter- 
movement. We should also note that a countermovement may in turn generate a 
counter-countermovement that is different from the original movement. Thus, 
for instance, the anti-abortion movement developed in response to the success 
of the pro-choice movement. A "counter-counter" movement then emerged moti- 
vated by the fear that the anti-abortion movement had theocratic and anti- 
pluralist goals. The counter-countermovement should be considered a new movement 
since it sought to promote goals broader than those of the original pro-choice 
movement and to mobilize a different constituency. 
The key word in the definition of countermovement is opposition. And if 
we are looking for a framework to analyze opposition we turn to conflict theory 
and its various forms. M/CM interaction is a kind of inter-group or inter- 
collectivity conflict. It shares certain attributes with fights, debates, 
games, and wars. The issue is what does it share with and how is it different 
from other forms of conflict? 
M/CM interaction has several properties that have been well analyzed in 
the conflict literature. (For an excellent review see Kriesberg, 1982). Mo- 
bilization of one side leads the other side to mobilize as well. The literature 
on community conflict within established communities is well described by 
writers such as Coleman (1955), Heirich (1971), and Coser (1956). They show 
that, given an initial conflict, the ties between the contending community 
groups break down, permitting other preexisting issues to surface; each side in 
the conflict has an incentive to raise new issues that may be more salient to, 
and thus recruit, uncommitted bystanders; the struggle increases solidarity 
within each conflict group and the misperception and primitivization of the 
other group's behavior; and a host of other reciprocating processes take place. 
As we tried to apply conflict theory here we found it somewhat limiting. 
First, while the explanatory power of the conflict model has been demonstrated 
with regard to the mobilization of geographic communities, the model fits less 
well when mobilization cuts across traditional community lines. When a move- 
ment's and countermovement's constituencies are not based on preexisting geo- 
graphical, ethnic, or institutional community divisions, the concept of com- 
munity polarization has little relevance. In those circumstances, the emergence 
of the movement and countermovement and their dynamic interaction arise only 
as a product of the movements' organizing effort itself, rather than from the 
disintegration of preexisting ties. For example, it would make little sense 
to describe the breakdown of .the preexisting ties between the pro and anti- 
nuclear forces because the movements' constituencies did not exist as groups 
before the conflict began. 
Second, the most general formulations of conflict theory (not Marxist 
class conflict approaches) pay little attention to the historical context and 
process by which interests in conflict get defined. Conflict theory tends 
to start from defined opposition. But how interests get defined and how counter 
interests get defined is an important problem for us. Historical process is 
important in another sense: conflict theory starts from the parties in view, 
when the latent sentiments on both sides are activated. There is a tendency 
to see the parties as kind of matched pairs, mobilizing at the same time. But 
as we thought about cases, it was clear that we needed a looser conceptualization 
Countermovements vary in how quickly they mobilize. For example, both the anti- 
abortion and the pro-nuclear power movements mobilized relatively quickly in 
the face of victories and mobilization on the other side. In contrast, the 
anti-prohibition forces took more than a decade to get up a head of steam 
(see Kyvig) . 
But there is a larger problem--because conflict theory is very general- 
it must encapsulate marital and martial conflict--it ignores the specific terrain 
over which M/CMs conflict: Movement and countermovement conflict with specific 
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means to promote or retard social change gains. To treat tactics at all, 
conflict theory must disembody them into abstracted resources played in a 
series of games. But we think it necessary to stay closer to concrete tactics. 
In searching for a frame of reference we turned to a specific kind of conflict. 
Possibly the analysis of wars would provide a template for analyzing M/CM inter- 
action. SMs and CSMs command pools of resources to be used in a variety of 
battlefields. Just as one nation may be stronger at sea and weaker on land, 
so a SM may be stronger on the streets and weaker in the courts. Moreover, 
a victori. or defeat in one arena or battlefield shifts the locus of attack, 
the nodal point for the next major battlefield. For instance, once the pro- 
abortion forces won the Supreme Court to its side, anti's shifted to the issue 
of use of federal funds. We presume that anti-abortionists would like to gain 
Supreme Court support. Yet until new constitutional grounds are found, or a 
different reading of the biology of "life" is convincingly presented, this 
battlefield is moot. 
The course of the war affects the salient nodal points and the ability -
to mobilize resources. In the course of the war, a SM, much like a state, 
may use up all of its resources, or through alliances gain added resources. 
Certainly, theanalysis of wars has a historical context, and the build- 
up of grievances is not treated as necessarily reciprocal. Moreover, there 
is differential timing of mobilization. Analysts of war also pay a great deal 
of attention to strategy and tactics. The mobilization of resources, the prob- 
lems of logistical support, attention to the nature of the battle, the rele- 
vance of technology to different battlefields are the core of military analysis. 
The analogy to war has a certain power, especially if we do not restrict 
the comparison to wars between nation states in the modern state system. 
Conventional warfare has a certain clarity of beginning and ending that lead 
us astray. Wars are declared, peace treaties signed. On the other hand, move- 
ments and countermovements start up and stop without formal announcement. In 
this respect they are more like guerrilla wars and ethnic insurgencies. One 
side may think the battle is over, while the other side has only gone under- 
ground. 
Another limit to the analogy is the differential role of third parties. 
In modern warfare, third parties play significant roles either as allies or 
neutral arbiters between the contending states. The United States, for example, 
has assumed both roles in the Middle East wars. Still, most often the key 
battle between movement and countermovement is to capture the authorities. 
Rather than direct conflict and vanquishing the opponent, as in a fight or 
game, the key issue for movement-countermovement conflict is the capturing or 
convincing of authorities. An analogous process does not exist in warfare. 
In addition, conventional wars are waged between well-defined actors and 
who speaks for the parties is clear. This is not true of movement/countermovement 
conflict, where the representation of the aggrieved constituency is often con- 
tested. Moreover, the goals of conventional warfare, the destruction of the 
opposing army, is less ambiguous than those of movements and countermovements. 
~ctivists in movements .and countermovements often have extended debates over 
whether to recruit, destroy, or simply ignore the other movement, authorities, 
and bystander publics. 
Finally, in Rapoport's terms, wars are more like fights or games, while 
social M/CM interactions are more like debates. Fights are attempts to van- 
quish or conquer opponents with little or no attention to costs, in games oppo- 
nents use strategies and compare costs of alternatives to outwit opponents. 
Debates rely on persuasion to convince and convert opponents and authorities. 
Of course, wars may have elements of debates, and social movements in conflict 
.may have elements of games and fights, but in their non-violent forms, or pre- 
violent stages, social movements and countermovements are involved in symbolic 
agitation. Indeed, even when they use violence they may be signifying. The 
violence is not, literally, to win a decisive coercive victory, but is to signify 
the strength of forces and the cost of continuing battles. Moreover, except 
in the case where the social movement has very limited and specific goals, it 
is involved in an ideological battle; the long run victory is a matter of 
changing values, symbols and frames for action (see Gusfield, 1981). 
Let us draw some guidelines from this too rambling perusal of conflict 
related literature. Social movement/countermovement interaction can be treated 
as a form of conflict behavior. Thus, the literature on polarization, spirals 
of conflict, and heightened mobilization is directly relevant. But four quali- 
fications, or limits, must be seen. First, M/CM relations must be seen as 
loosely coupled conflict. The parties to the conflict change over time. 
In addition, there may be discontinuity between the mobilization of the M and CM, 
so that CM sentiments may not be quickly mobilized. The definition of the 
conflict issues is part of the agenda. Finally, the CM and SM may fight on 
different battlefields so that how the issues are joined, where adherents perform 
is problematic. 
Second, movement/countermovement is a kind'of a debate. Like parties to 
a debate, movement and countermovement try to persuade each other and third 
parties with rhetoric, moral arguments, and appeals to reason. The persuasion 
component is absent, or.less prevalent, in fights and games. 
Third, the tactical repertoires of movement and countermovement are shaped 
by the existing technology and social structure. In this respect, movement and 
countermovement are like wars, but unlike games and debates where tactics are 
arbitrary. 
Finally, movement and countermovement confront each other within the con- 
text of a larger society. They attempt to coerce, to change perceptions of, 
to seek support from publics, reference elites, authorities, and other external 
groups. 
11. Getting Started: Components for M/CM Analysis 
It is difficult enough to get relatively complete descriptions of a 
movement, let alone of a movement-countermovement and their interaction. 
Nevertheless, analysis of M/CM interaction must start from a well grounded 
description of both SMs. In this section we suggest the central elements of a 
M/CM analysis. 
Comparative-historical description of movement and countermovement. 
We now have a relatively well developed set of categories for describing 
social movements. These include a) the distribution of sentiments in socio- 
demographic space; b) the major SMOs and their interrelations in the SMI 
(SMI is described both in terms of the ideological range and hegemony, and 
monopoly-competitive relations of SMOs and also the relation of industry 
structure to targets. (That is, for instance,--local targets require a de- 
centralized structure, unitary national targets pull forth a more centralized 
structure); c) the funding-labor resource supports; d) the repertoire of 
tactics as these relate to social base (a-c) and to targets (e.g., courts, 
elites, administrative agencies, media, and legislatures.) 
It should be apparent that a cross-sectional comparative analysis will 
reveal the differential social location and organization of the movement 
and countermovement. In the process the different resource dependencies and 
tactical dilemmas are described. Useem and Zald (1982), for instance, show 
how the pro-nuclear energy groups were faced with problems of credibility 
and legitimacy because some (many) of them emerged from and had the support 
of large industrial firms in the nuclear power sector. 
Sociologists, unfortunately, tend to deal with short time periods. As 
soon as we introduce a longer time frame into our comparative analysis, shifts 
in both the support base, coalitions, tactics, SMI organization, and re- 
lation to authorities become apparent. Events from one period limit the choices 
and responses of the next. Two issues from the civil rights - anti-civil rights 
movement illustrate the point. First, note that in 1955 it was not at all clear 
that the Federal Government would use force to back up the Supreme Court's 
ruling in Brown. That Eisenhower did call out the national guard in the face 
of Orville Faubus' refusal to allow school integration to proceed in Little Rock 
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changed the balance of terror and violence in the remaining years of the s~uthern 
civil rights movement. Blacks and whites in the movement were still terrorized, 
but the fact that the Klan was in disarray and disrepute and that the Federal 
Government was seen as watching and might intervene limited the tactics of 
the anti's (see Ashmore, 1982). On the organizational side, Brown released 
a tremendous.growth. Throughout the post World War I1 era there had been . 
attempts by the pro-civil rights groups to break the back of racism in the south - 
challenges to the primary system, fights over voting rights, over participation 
in the Democratic party. None of these prompted a large anti-movement because 
the pro's never seemed to be winning or won only small victories. Brown signaled 
a direct attack on a central institution, the segregated soh001 system. In 
response a large, middle class and elite non-violent mobilization occurred, 
the Citizens Councils (see Carter, 111; McMillen; Bartley, 1.  What is 
most interesting from our perspective is, a) they disappeared as the Federal 
Courts insisted upon, and were backed up by federal marshals, integrating, at 
least in token fashion, the school system. By the early 60s they had largely 
vanished; b) no large scale organizational mobilization occurred in the next 
phase of the civil rights movement, even though Southern authorities, individuals 
and businessmen resisted quite vehemently. We can only speculate why there 
was so little organizational development in the later phase. But the key point 
is that the mobilization and interaction of M/CM must be nested in a historical 
context. cross-sectional description must be carried forward and back. 
Mobilization problems of the countermovement. 
Although implied above, special attention must be paid to the timing of 
the mobilization of the countermovement. Here the war metaphor distracts, for 
the attack of one nation requires the mobilization of the attacked, unless 
the attacked is to supinely accept defeat, while movements may win major battles 
before CM sentiments are mobilized. What effects the timing and form of the 
countermovement mobilization? We first present a simple model of movement 
mobilization. Using this model, we then identify four factors that are es- 
. 'pecially important in explaining the timing of countermovement mobilization. 
They are a clear victory or anticipated victory for the movement, the availa- 
bility of resources and leadership from ongoing organizations and institutions, 
the problems of formulating an appropriate ideology, and societal events that 
shift agendas of action. 
In general, a group is likely to mobilize if (1) the group's members 
believe that they will benefit by the achievement of a movement's goals; 
( 2 )  victory is reasonably likely, and 3) an organizational infra structure 
reduces costs. A victory is likely if first, the movement has many recruits, 
fungible resources, and an appropriate ideology. Second, the task is relatively 
easy in relationship to the strength of the movement. This model is elabo- 
rated below. 
A. Movement success. A countermovement is likely to emerge if the move- 
ment appears to be accomplishing its goals. A movement's success makes clear to 
a ,countermovement's constituency the benefits of collective action. For ex- 
ample, movement victories in cases before the U.S. Supreme Court crystalized 
the anti-abortion and Southern anti-civil rights movement. The anti-abortion 
movement emerged following the Supreme Court decision to decriminaljze abortion 
in 1973 and the White Citizens' Councils date from the 1954 decision that it 
is illegal to racially segregate schools. 
A countermovement is unlikely to mobilize, however, if the movement wins 
a huge crushing victory. Under these circumstances, the countermovement will 
become paralyzed as supporters see little chance of success. For example, 
by the mid-1960s the Southern white resistance had dissipated, even though 
the civil rights movement continued its struggle. Between 1954 and the early 
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1960s the civil rights movement gained the moral support of a broad sector of 
the American public and the legal and coercive backing of the federal govern- 
ment. We suspect that the segregationists' failure to keep schools segregated 
contributed to their inability to mobilize in the next phase of the civil 
rights movement. 
Similar reasoning explains why the anti-prohibition forces delayed the 
mobilization of the repeal movement until 10 years after the passage of the 
constitutional amendment prohibiting alcohol. Repeal of a constitutional 
amendment, especially immediately after it is enacted, is a difficult task 
and the anti's had become discredited and disorganized. Thus, the anti- 
prohibition forces needed additional time before they could launch a movement. 
B. Appropriate ideology. Mobilization will not occur unless a movement 
articulates an ideology which arouses enthusiasm and creates commitment 
(Bottomore, 1979: 47). Countermovements often lack such an ideology at the 
outset, but may develop it as the struggle proceeds. For example, the Catholic 
Church's doctrine concerning the "sacredness" of life provided the anti-abor- 
tion movement with an ideology in place around which the movement could mo- 
bilize. This relatively narrow doctrine, however, was not capable of mobili- 
zing individuals outside the church. Only with the development of an ideology 
about the relationship of abortion to family life and the role of women in 
society was the anti-abortion movement able to draw on a broader constituency. 
Similarly, the pro-nuclear movement was initially mobilized around the in- 
2 
dustry's claim that nuclear power is a safe and efficient energy source.- 
However, the mobilization of a constituency outside the industry required 
a doctrine relating nuclear power to the promotion of the standard of living, 
2 - Useem and Zald (.1983) document the process by which supporters of 
nuclear power transformed their ideology and organization to appeal to and 
gain support from groups without direct attachment to the utilities and 
reactor construction firms. 
achievement of independence on foreign oil, and establishing the altruism of 
its own constituency in comparison to the self-serving goals of the anti-nuclear 
activists. 
C.Pvailability of resources. Countermovements may be delayed if there 
are no groups with discretionary'resources available to invest in collective 
action. A countermovement's location in the social structure will largely 
determine the availability of such resources. In general, movements are 
launched by groups from "below" and attack established interests. Since they 
respond to these attacks, countermovements will often (not always) be linked 
to established interests and organizations. Countermovements' ties to the 
established order will tend to both help and hinder the provision of the requi- 
site resources. On the one hand, countermovements will be launched by corporate 
groups rich in fungible resources such as money, office space, and clerical 
help. On the other hand, the countermovement's ties to the established order 
may preclude the use of these resources for non-institutionalized action. The 
nuclear power industry, for example, controlled many of the resources needed 
by the pro-nuclear movement, but was reluctant to provide them. The industry 
was accountable to stockholders, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and other 
federal, state, and local government agencies. These ties prevented the use 
of industry resources for any but the most mild type of protest. 
These difficulties, however, are not necessarily insuperable. One stra- 
tegy used by countermovements is to maintain a decentralized structure. This 
allows the established group within the movement to provide the necessary re- 
sources to the movement, and yet allow it to disassociate itself from actions 
taken by groups it has helped bring into existence. For example, Boston's 
political establishment was heavily involved in the anti-busing movement launched 
in that city in the fall of 1974. City officials held key posts in the anti- 
busing movement organization and the facilities of city hall were used for anti- 
busing activities. City officials, however, could not easily advocate violence 
or other illegal forms of resistance, since the federal court and U.S. Justice 
Department were closely monitoring their actions. Several of them were lawyers, 
and feared disbarment and the loss of their livelihoodshould they openly resist 
the federal court. Militant and occasionally illegal actions, however, were 
taken by other adherents. For example, during the first two years of desegre- 
gation, anti-busing protestors congregated in front of the schools in their 
neighborhood. The demonstrators taunted black students as they entered and 
left the school and on several occasions hurled rocks at buses carrying blacks. 
After one such protest, a crowd of several hundred attacked and beat a black man 
who had happened to stop his car at a red light near the demonstration. The 
anti-busing leaders did not participate in these "spontaneous" actions. 
Although the established leadership did not actually participate in these actions, 
they often provided their tacit support for them. For example, Elvira "Pixie" 
Palladino, a top leader in the anti-busing organization ROAR and elected member 
of the School Committee, commented on the beating of a black man: "My first 
reaction from the pit of my stomach, was that he got exactly what he deserved. 
He had no business of being over there [South Boston] in the first place" . 
(Boston Globe, 5/25/75) . 
D. Constraints and opportunities. Finally, a factor much overlooked in 
the study of movements as well as countermovements, the public agenda may or 
may not "permit" the emergence of movement or countermovement. Wars, de- 
pressions, the existence of other movements, the focus on other events, crowds 
the space for M/CM action (see Downs, Walker). It can be argued that the growth 
/ - 
bf-the m~Sement~~romotin~ nsw-right eco~lomics is really- a postponed effo7t to 
overturn Roosevelt New Deal economic policies, World War I1 and the cooptive 
election of Eisenhower, being key events in postponing the CMs resurgence. 
Similarly, World War I intervened to effectively block the anti-prohibition 
forces. The war discredited the leadership of the anti-prohibitionists 
because many were brewers of German origin (Kyvig). 
In addition, political structures vary in the extent.to which they provide 
movement opportunities. Schwartz (19811, for example, found that the American 
&_overmental/ 
system provides more points of entry to social movements than the one . 
in Canada. Similarly, Lipset's (1968) analysis of why a mass socialist movement 
arose in Saskatchewan, but not in neighboring North Dakota or Alberta, em- 
phasizes the impcat of differing electoral systems on social movements. Lipset 
argues that since the social and economic structures of all three regions were 
nearly identical, structural or psychological factors cannot account for the 
movements' differing success in the three regions. Rather, the variations are 
explained primarily by differences in the electoral mechanisms in the regions. 
By paying attention to the special mobilization problems of the CM, we 
do not imply that they have more problems in mobilization than the movement. 
Indeed, since CMs are often linked to the elite and established order, they 
may have more resources (e-g., money and established organizations) available 
than movements, even while their repertoire of tactics is constrained by their 
class origins and commitment to order. Focusing upon the timing of CM mobi- 
lization comes out of our awareness of the loosely coupled nature of M/CM 
interaction. It helps explain the nature of that coupling. Examination of 
the spirals of mobilization and demobilization also helps us understand. the 
nature of the M/CM connection. 
Spirals of Mobilization? 
With a historical view of both movement and countermovement before one, 
it becomes possible to lay out the phases of mobilization and demobilization. 
Sociological analyses of conflict tend to assume a close connection between 
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the mobilization of one party in a conflict and the mobilization of the other. 
They assume a "fight," and tight and reciprocal action is expected. They also 
tend to focus more on the mobilization phase than on the demobilization phase. 
(For an exception see Kriesberg, 1982). A spiral of conflict and demobili~ation 
is most likely to occur where there is a unitary target of conflict, or, where 
there are unified parties to the conflict, so that one party calls forth re- 
sources as the other party calls forth resources. Wars have spirals of mobi- 
lization and demobilization because central decision bodies are able to commit 
the uncommitted resources of their social systems, whether through authoritative 
allocations or through mechanisms of propaganda and persuasion. Unitary targets, 
single decision points or meeting places of conflicting groups, lead to tightly 
connected spirals of mobilization. It is apparent to actors on both sides that 
a battle is taking placera'ndithat one side is missing, or threatening to win; 
failure to mobilize, to respond, will permit a victory to the other side. 
Fights over school board policy, conflicts about holding of parades, battles 
-'l . 
to integrate genders, all have a f6cal pointlfor conflict. 
This spiral model does apply to some social movement/CM cycles, but the 
loosely coupled nature of M/CM interaction means that there may be wide de- 
partures from tight spirals. First, many sympathizers and adherents are not 
tightly tied to SMOs and the solidary bonds that integrate them into movement 
oriented action. Thus, even while some part of the movement, say a SMO, may 
be conducting a significant battle in the courts, in the legislature, even in 
a community, many parts of the movement may be unaware of it, paying little 
attention to it. Similarly, on the CM side. Second, because the CM and SM 
face different environments, their cognitive maps of potential risk-reward 
(see Oberschall for micro risk-reward maps) may lead one party to be demobi- 
lizing because, for instance, they have recently won a victory, while the other 
party mobilizes because the victory for the other side presents the hard 
grievance around which they can mobilize. 
Finally, movement and countermovement differ in the length of time they 
have been fighting and in their internal social organizaiion. Rather than a 
spiral of conflict, one may sometimes see opposing paths of mobilization and 
demobilization. If, for instance, the movement has appeared to be successful, 
its supporters may believe that they can rest. The emergence of a CM may create 
despair and hopelessness: The movement may rekindle the flame only as new 
generations of adherents are brought into the debate, or after the older gener- 
ation has retreated and rejuvenated its commitment. 
So far, we have described the spirals of conflict largely in terms of 
individual actors and their motivation. Another aspect is the mobilization of 
organizations. The SMI grows as the pool of adherents and resources enlarges 
and is exploited by movement entrepreneurs. SMOs are staffed by cadre with 
deeper commitments than mere sympathizers or adherents. There very well may 
be time lags and disjunctions between the cycles and peaks of sentiments and 
the level of SMO activity. SMOs develop protected niches, sources of funding 
and support from institutions (the churches, foundations, and government grants) 
and from individual contributors to the SMO per se (organizational loyalty). 
Thus, SMOs may exist and fight battles long after sentiment base support has 
disappeared. We take it that much of the battle over school busing is based 
upon movement organizations disconnected from the presumed underlying population. 
(In Atlanta the local black population was largely opposed to the attempt of 
NAACP, Inc. Fund lawyers to press the case for county-wide desegregation). 
The disjunction between the mobilization level of SMOs and the sentiments for 
action of sympathizers is very important for understanding the interregnum 
periods of social movement conflict. SMOs, operating out of protected niches, 
continue their program and wait for another wave of social movement support to 
emerge so that they can once again mount the crest. At the very least, analysis 
of M/CM interaction must describe the growth and decline of MOs and CMOS as 
well as other forms of mobilization and levels and forms of conflict. 
Although we have emphasized the'limits of the spiral of conflict notion, 
the disjunctions.and even opposite patterns of mobilization of individuals 
and SMOs may occur, the spiral of conflict idea powerfully focuses our atten- 
tion on the interaction-of movement and countermovement. They are locked in 
a conflict dance. Movement and CM are engaged in a battle joined. 
The battle joined. 
Central to M/CM analysis is a description of the strategies and tactics 
and forms of conflict, how and where they interact. A wide range of forms of 
battle exists, from direct confrontation, to lobbying authorities, to speaking 
to disparate audiences, to debating the shadows of previous generations. 
Second, we need to describe the strategic goals and tactics of movements and 
countermovements when they meet each other. 
Forms of meeting. 
Where do they meet? How do they proceed to achieve goals? M/CM may meet 
head-on in an "encounter," a face-to-face interaction with a single focus of 
attention (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina, 1982: . In an encounter, members 
of each group have a heightened awareness of the other group, and respond 
accordingly. The most dramatic encounters often-take place "on the streets" 
or other public locations loosely regulated by authorities. For example, during 
the height of Boston school desegregation controversy, local anti-busing move- 
ment advocates became deeply involved in a racial confrontation between blacks 
and whites at Carson beach, a strip of public beach between all-white South 
Boston and a black housing project. The conflict began when a white crowd 
attacked six black salesmen visiting the city who were strolling on the beach. 
The NAACP then organized a "picnic" demonstration several days later to assert 
blacks' rights to use the beach. The anti-busing leaders organized a 
counter-demonstration. A massive fight broke out between the two demon- 
strating groups. 
Other types of encounters are more structured and less likely to in- 
volve violent conflict. For example, the representatives of the pro- and 
anti-nuclear movements have frequently debated on university campuses and 
television public affairs shows. The most highly structured type of an en- 
counter setting is probably the court. Many of the cases described in Joel 
Handler's Social Movements and the Legal System (1979) involve movement and 
countermovement representation in legal battle (see also Barkin). 
Second, movement and countermovement can be joined in the sense that they 
attempt to influence the same third parties. For example, the::movementt to le- 
galize marijuana and the countermovement to oppose its legalization are both 
attempting to influence the public, national and state legislators, and the 
medical establishment. Rarely, however, have they met in a face-to-face en- 
counter. 
Finally, movement and countermovement may be joined only in the sense that 
they attempt to undo the effects of the other. It is a countermovement, not a 
new movement, to the extent that it is engaged with.organizations and actors 
representing the original movement, or it debates the position of the movement. 
The anti-prohibition groups that got prohibition repealed come close to being 
a new movement. They were led by different groups than had led the original 
battle. Indeed, they were led by elite businessmen (who were Dupont connected). 
They were not so much pro-alcohol as they were anti-government interference. 
They converted some supporters of prohibition by arguing that prohibition was 
not eliminating alcohol drinking at the same time that it was contributing to 
lawlessness and "lack of respect for law." The AAPA was originally bi-partisan, 
but saw the Democrats and Roosevelt as more likely supporters of repeal. 
2 0 
. 
Raskob, the leader of AAPA, became the chairman of the Democratic party. The 
leaders of AAPA split from the Democrats when they believed that Roosevelt 
was taking a statist tack. Many of them went on to found the Liberty League, 
an organization dedicated to restricting the role of government. We consider 
AAPA a countermovement'because it did have to confront some of the same groups 
that had supported prohibition and because the debate was framed in terms of 
the value of the legislation which the movement had promoted. 
Strategic goals and tactics of movement/countermovement interaction. 
Movement and countermovement interactions may vary in the environmental 
context in which they meet. They may also vary in the extent to which the 
groups locked in conflict seek to exclude the other group from the political 
arena. Movement and countermovement may attempt to damage or destroy the other 
group, preempt or dissuade the other group from mobilizing, or recruit the 
other group's members. 
Damaging Actions. One strategy used by movements and countermovements 
is to try to raise the cost of mobilization for the other group. Let us examine 
in some detail the efforts of the pro-nuclear movement to raise these costs 
for the anti-nuclear movement. 
Before we proceed two caveats are necessary. First, when we consider 
the pro-nuclear movement's effort to damage the anti-nuclear movement, it is 
often difficult to distinguish "industry activities" from "movement activities." 
For example, when a utility company presses charges against anti-nuclear 
"trespassers," is this a pro-nuclear movement activity or simply a business 
effort to protect its property? We consider activities directed against the 
anti-nuclear forces "movement" activities, when those who initiate or engage 
in them view them as part of a political struggle. This "rule" is problematic 
in that it relies on often difficult to measure state of mind factors. 
A second caveat is that our focus is on specific social movement efforts 
to damage other social movements. Of less concern are the broader strategies 
used by one movement'to defeat another (see our comments on preemptive strate- 
gies, below). Thus, we assume that general issues concerning M/CM interaction 
can be distinguished from specific actions taken'by one movement' to damage 
another. For example, the attempt of anti-abortion movement groups to amend 
the constitution would be treated as part of overall strategy, not an action 
directed against the pro-abortion movement. Bombings of abortion clinics or 
disruption of pro-abortion rallies would be treated as direct acts against the 
movement. 
The pro-nuclear movement took a number of actions against the anti-nuclear 
movement. The categories used to describe these activities are drawn from 
Marx's (1979) discussion of the most prevalent forms of government action 
against the protest movements of the 1960s. We discuss attempts to gather 
information, limit the flow of resources, and portray the anti-nuclear move- 
ment in a negative light. 
A. Information Gathering. A central aspect of government efforts to damage 
the protest movements in the 1960s was the collection of information on dis- 
sidents. As Marx notes, "knowing that agents are gathering information on 
it may make a social movement less open and democratic, require that limited 
resources be devoted to security, and may deter participation" (1979: 99). 
Some pro-nuclear groups have initiated surveillance activities of anti-nuclear 
activists and organizations. Utility companies have taken pictures of anti- 
nuclear demonstrators, copied license plate numbers near anti-nuclear rallies, 
and maintained files of individual anti-nuclear activists (Wall Street Journal, 
1/14/79). Whether these information gathering activities are intended to 
damage the anti-nuclear movement is open to question. Industry spokespeople 
claim that they are part of legitimate security measures. Nuclear power critics, 
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however, charge that the surveillance programs are designed to discourage 
support for their movement. For example, in a hearing before a state regula- 
tory commission, an anti-nuclear group charged that a utility's surveillance 
program had served to "suppress and chill opponents of nuclear power and anyone 
else who differs from (the company's) policies" (Wall Street Journal, 1/11/79) 
In addition to collecting their own information, several utility companies 
hired security firms to collect information on anti-nuclear protestors. A 
West Coast utility publicly acknowledged that it retained two security firms, 
Research West and Information Digest, for that purpose. Similar information 
was revealed in files obtained in the litigation that followed the 1977 and 
1978 Seabrook nuclear power plant construction site. There the utility also 
hired two private security firms, Operational Systems, Inc. and Information 
Digest, to obtain information on the Clamshell Alliance (Center for National 
Security Studies, 1981: 69). 
At least one "citizens" group, the U.S. Labor Party, collected infor- 
mation on the anti's for the explicit purpose of damaging the movement. The 
Seabrook files mentioned above revealed that the Labor Party had provided the 
New Hampshire State Police and the FBI with details of the Clamshell's tactical 
plans to occupy the power plant. When asked about these and other efforts to 
collect information on the anti-nuclear movement, a Labor Committee spokesman 
stated: "This is political warfare. We're running a political intelligence 
operation to expose them (anti-nuclear activists). We will cooperate with 
any organization willing to root out this evil" (Guardian, 12/5/79). The 
Labor Committee also claims to have infiltrated the Clamshell Alliance, in- 
cluding its top leadership, for the purposes of information gathering (Guardian, 
12/5/79). 
Finally, the industry's two main trade associations, Atomic Industrial 
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Forum and Edison Electric Institute, maintained files on anti-nuclear opponents. 
In at least one instance, the trade associations requested utility companies 
in a number of cities to attend and report back on meetings of a particular 
anti-nuclear group (Washington Post, 11/21/77). In addition, the AIF alleged- 
ly disseminated information on anti-nuclear leaders to its members, inclu- 
ding utility companies (Campaign for Political Rights, 1979: 3 ) .  
B. Restricting Resources. Another tactic used by the government to da- 
mage protest movements in the 1960s was to restrict the flow of resources to 
them, physical space, and employment opportunities (Marx, 1979: 99-100). The 
pro-nuclear movement also attempted to reduce the anti-nuclear forces! access 
to resources. Pro-nuclear activists tried to eliminate the federal funding 
of citizen intervenors in regulatory proceedings. The Federal Trade Commission, 
ACTION, the Department of Energy, and other governmental agencies and programs 
traditionally provided such funds (Metzger, 1980: 40). Several pro-nuclear 
movement organizations, such as Americans for Nuclear Energy and the Nuclear 
Legislative Advisory Services, led efforts to prevent further disbursement of 
government funds to anti-nuclear intervenor groups (Nuclear Legislative Ad- 
visory Service, 6/21/81; Nuclear Advocate, 6/80). In another effort, several 
campus chapters of pro-nuclear movement groups organized efforts to eliminate 
the use of student fees to fund campus anti-nuclear organizations (Interview 
Nos. 19, 25). 
Finally, two pro-nuclear groups have used civil litigation to financially 
damage an anti-nuclear organization. The New Hampshire Voice of Energy (NHVOE) 
and Americans for More Power Sources AMPS) have sued the Coalition for Direct 
Action at Seabrook, a faction within the Clamshell Alliance. The suit's stated 
purpose is to "recover the cost to the taxpayer for the added protection ne- 
cessary to protect life, limb and property" during demonstrations at the Sea- 
- - 
.brook nuclear power constriction site (INFO No. 143, 1980: 4) . 
I 
According to Tina Coruth, president of NHVOE, "Our suit is a way for the 
Seabrook demonstrators to pay their own way. It's not right for the New 
Hampshire taxpayer to pick up the tab for the added police protection during 
those anti-nuclear demonstrations" (INFO No. 143, 1980: 4) . 
C. Efforts to Produce a Negative Image. Another technique used to damage 
.the movement in the 1960s was to create an unfavorable public image of it 
(March, 1979: 96-98). The pro-nuclear movement has also used this strategy. 
Several utility companies'have collected and disseminated derogatory infor- 
mation on anti-nuclear groups. Between 1973 and 1977 Georgia Power Company, 
for example, operated a sophisticated surveillance program on company critics, 
including the anti-nuclear Georgia Power Project. A former company,investigator 
described the surveillance program as "dirt gathering" efforts to label its 
opponents as "commies and queers" (Center for National Security Studies, 1981: 
67-68). Similarly, in 1978 Philadelphia Electric Company photographed anti- 
nuclear demonstrators and kept files on their activities. The company gave 
copies of the photographs to a local television station which used them in a 
story that ridiculed the demonstrators. An anti-nuclear group filed an ad- 
ministrative complaint with the state Public Service Commission, charging that 
rate payers' money was being illegally used on a campaign to spy on and "sup- 
press and smear" critics of nuclear power (Center for National Security 
Studies, 1981 : 75) . 
The U. S. Labor Party has also attempted to discredit the anti-nuclear 
movement. In 1977, the Labor Party told New Hampshire state authorities that 
a planned demonstration at Seabrook construction site was "nothing but a cover 
for terrorist activity" (Center for National Security Studies, 1981: 7). 
Governor Meldren Thompson and the Manchester Union-Leader accepted and widely 
publicized the allegation. The Labor party has made similar charges against 
. 
anti-nuclear activists in Maryland and New York (Centerfor National Se- 
curity Studies, 1981: 7). 
The pro-nuclear movement was initiated to directly counter the increased 
success of the anti's in mobilizing public support. In other cases, the 
battle may be more indirect. Movement and Countermovement may attempt to 
rally different segments of the public and/or reference clients to bring 
pressure on authorities. Or the movement may be fighting a legal battle 
in court, while some countermovement organization leads a legislative battle. 
Preemptive Strategies. Alternatively, a movement may design its strategy 
and tactics in ways which undercut the moral'and pol-itical basis of a counter 
or a counter-counter mobilization. Ghandi's satyagraha campaigns in India 
and South Africa, for example, were designed to undercut the moral position 
of their opponents. 
Similary, Oberschall (1973: Ch.6) argues that Martin Luther King suc- 
ceeded in part because he delayed a major counter-attack by Southern whites. 
White control of jobs and credit, the court system, and the political appa- 
ratus gave the white power structure sufficient leverages to crush a black 
insurgency. King's tactic of non-violent resistance made direct retaliation 
more difficult: 
King must be seen as a man who solved a technical problem 
that had stumped Negro leaders for generations. As a powerless 
group living in the middle of a powerful majority that hated and 
feared them, Negroes could not stage an open revolt. To go unto 
the streets under those conditions with open demands for change 
was suicidal . . . King and the sit-in students solved the tech- 
nical problems by clothing a national resistance movement in the 
comforting garb of love, forgiveness, and nonviolence, a trans- 
formation that enabled Negroes to stage an open revolt without 
calling it an open revolt. (Lerone Bennett,quoted in Oberschall, 
1973: 2 2 ) .  
Choice of strategy involves much beyond merely the nature.of the opposi- 
tion - the repertoires of action, constituency acceptability, resources 
available, and relations to authorities. But one component affecting choice 
is M/CM relations. 
Persuasion and Recruitment. Finally, movementsand countermovements may 
attempt to persuade the members of the opposition group to join their side of the 
controversy. 
In general, however, movements and countermovements are unlikely to take 
this strategy as part of short-term strategy. First, it requires an individual 
to disengage from one movement and then engage one in opposition to it. The 
individual must both reverse his or her ideological position, and oppose a 
group of people with which he or she was recently associated. Second, the 
pool of neutral bystanders is usually much larger than the number of poten- 
tially recruitable individuals in the opposition group. Thus, recruitment 
drives aimed -at bystanders -is likely to net more recruits than one directed 
at the opposition. 
Nevertheless, there are circumstances in which movements can recruit 
from the opposition group. For instance, the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks as- 
- -  - -  
sumed a movement / coun te rmovemen t r~~ t ionsh ip in  . the period between the 
February and October revolutions. -The Bolsheviks triumphed in part because 
they recruited large numbers of disaffected Mensheeiks. Factors that made the 
transfer of allegiance possible included Menshevik support of an increasing- 
ly unpopular war, an emerging belief that only the Bolsheviks could defend 
the government against counter-revolutionary forces, and Bolshevik support 
of workers taking over factories and peasants seizing land (Thomas, 1981). 
In our own time we have seen "neo-conservatives" emerge from among the in- 
tellectual leaders of the moderate left. We suspect that conversion occurs 
in loosely coupled conflict over 1ong.time periods more than in tightly coupled 
conflict. 
The battle joined includes conflict in the courts, in the streets, and in 
the hearts and minds of persons. Often it involves the attempt of Movement 
or Countermovement to gain the cooperation of authorities. Yet there are a 
wide number of authority - M/CM relations possible. 
1 
Movement, Countermovement, and Authorities- 
The traditional model of social movement analysis begins from a stable 
position - a government in place, facing. groups with routine access (members) 
and groups with no' access. As groups with no access develop grievances they 
attempt to gain access and may mobilize social movements. Similarly, groups 
with routine access may find their ability to gain authoritative allocations 
undermined. They, too, may resort to social movement mobilization. State 
officials, authorities and their differentiated agents (civil servants, mili- 
tary officers), may have their own interests. They may "represent" groups 
- -- - -  - -- .- - - - a - - 
I - There is a bothersome analytic-conceptual issue in this section-- 
is any action of an authority that bears on M/CM interaction part of the M or CM? 
Stated differently, how does one differentiate political and authoritative action 
from M/CM action? A definitive answer cannot be given, but a range of answers 
can. At one extreme, action by authorities that is well institutionalized and 
legitimated in the social'system may have impact on social movements but is not 
in itself considered social movement activity. Through fully institutionalized 
means, Margaret Thatcher has impact on the fate of conservatism and socialism 
in Great Britain. On the other hand, Costa-Gravas' "Z" and CIA'S intervention 
against Allende in Chile are examples of countermovement activity. This view 
of M/CM activity as it relates to the action of authorities is based upon a 
western legal rational model of state activity. It posits a separate insti- 
tutionalized political sphere, with Ms and CMs operating outside of, or at the 
margin of, the institutionalized sphere. 
At the other extreme, if one takes an ideational view of social movements, 
ignoring or downplaying the mobilization of movement activity in the definition 
of social movement, the distinction between state action and social movement 
action becomes meaningless. Then Margaret Thatcher is clearly part of the con- 
servative countermovement, indeed a leader of it. But then one loses the abi- 
lity to make distinctions between social movement activity and political ac- 
tivity in general (or one shifts it down a level, to the distinction between 
institutionalized and un-institutionalized). We maintain the distinction bet- 
ween authoritative action and social movement (or countermovement) action. 
However, to the extent that state action is largely directed to carrying out pro 
or anti-social movement actions, we have a conceptual difference with little 
empirical relevance. 
in civil society, but they may also embody ideologies and interests which 
lead them to press for changes in other parts of the state apparatus. Yet, 
it is also possible for groups to conflict in society with but minimal state 
intervention; movement and countermovement proceed with marginal use of the 
police and authorities. Figure 1 presents some of the possible models of 
authority, M/CM relations. It would be possible to present a more graphically 
elegant and complicated set of models. Negative and positive lines could be 
added, identities between state and SM made, intensities shaded. But for our 
crude and preliminary purposes, these will suffice to illustrate the range of 
relations. Model A, Conflict with minimal state intervention, occurs where 
the movement and countermovement battle for members or for control with little 
attempt to change laws or to gain state support. Bromley and Shupe and Shupe, 
Bromley and Busching have examined the relationship between the Unification 
Church (Moonies) and anti-Moonies in these terms. The anti-Moonies consisted 
of the parents of Moonies and de-programmers. The state could have become in- 
- - .- 
volved if the police had been willing to intervene when the chur&hclaimed their 
- .  
members were being kidnapped. The de-programmers and parents used the rhetoric 
of "family matters" to insulate the police from action. 
A striking feature of this model is how few cases it describes. Movement 
and countermovement usually appeal to authorities. First, movements do not 
control the resources and are not sufficiently stable to implement major changes 
in society. Ratherithey attempt to shift the cost of achieving change from 
themselves to the government and polity at large. The civil rights movement, 
for example, could to some extent desegregate public facilities through their 
own actions. The lunch-counter sit-ins were in part an attempt to directly 
affect change. Still, the change"' they sought was so massive that it could 
only be achieved when the government applied its resources to the problem. 
Similarly, anti-nuclear demonstrators have occupied plant construction sites 
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with the purported goal of physically blocking further construction. Still, 
the overall success of the movement depended much more on the position taken 
by the government than specific effects of its actions on the industry. 
Second, usually one side or the other will perceive that it is in their 
interest to seek the involvement of authorities. Schattschneider's (1960) 
analysis suggests that this will tend to be the weaker of the two parties, since 
the stronger will generally prevail as long as the dispute remains private. 
If, however, the stronger party feels that the government is reasonably certain 
to take its gid'e3 it will seek the involvement of state authorities. A clear 
example is offered by a recent dispute between an insurgency movement in the 
US. Steel Workers Union and established leadership. The insurgency movement, 
led by Ed Sadlowski, had expanded the scope of the conflict by obtaining the 
financial support of liberal and radical groups outside of the union. The union 
leadership sued in federal court to prevent the insurgent group from receiving 
outside help, and won in a Supreme Court decision. 
Model B, Authority is the countermovement, occurs where the movement di- 
rectly attacks the state and the state is the countermovement. Arno Mayer's -
analysis of conservative authorities' response to working class upheavals from 
the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, starts from an identity of in- 
terest between conservative groups and state authority. Authorities and con- 
servative interests are at one. (see footnote) 
Model C places the state at the center of the conflict between movement 
and countermovement. Both movement and countermovement attempt to convince 
authorities of their position and demonstrate their strength. The triangle is 
left "open," however, since movement and countermovement do not directly 
attack each other. The struggle over repeal of prohibition looks something 
like this. Model C is a model of competitive debate. 
The."closed" triangle of model D suggests that movement and counter- 
movement seek to both make demands on the government and damage the other 
movement. The model describes the conflict between the pro and anti- 
nuclear movements, as described above. 
Model E represents a revolutionary situation, where movement and 
countermovement have established that to a significant part of the popu- 
lation they are the government. The movements control territory, raise 
taxes, conscript soldiers and perform other governmental functions 
(Tilly, 1978: 190-192). 
Model F indicates that.the local government can be aligned with 
countermovements in.a struggle against central authorities. The model des- 
cribes the anti-busing movement in.Boston and the anti-civil rights movement 
in the South. In both cases, local officials helped sponsor and mobilize 
a countermovement. National officials became aligned with the movement. 
It would be possible to make this analysis more complex. Not only do local 
and national authorities vary in their movement alignments, but so do authorities 
in different agencies at the same level. But the purpose of the analysis is to 
embed M/CM interaction in the larger authority-political system. Ultimately- 
movement and countermovement contend for support. They attempt to make allian- 
ces, to seize opportunities for gaining power. The structured differentiation 
and ideology of authorities provides the ground for political opportunity. 
For politically oriented movements and countermovements, state authori- 
ties and agents are the target in view, their actions are oriented to either 
changing authoritative allocations or to becoming the authorities themselves. 
Whether through revolution, marginal accomodation or conversion, the immediate 
target is state action. 
Movement and countermovement, of course, differ amongst themselves in 
I 
the breadth and depth of their ideologies. How much change is necessary 
to "really" accomplish goals? The variation in and depth of ideology re- 
lates to the symbolic framing of the debates. 
V. Outcomes: History Social Change & Social Movements 
It is possible for movements to be quite successful in winning specific 
authoritative allocations, yet have little impact on changing the definition 
of the situation. Conversely, all of the short-run battle may be lost, but 
in the long run the grounds of decision making are radically changed. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to enter the vital discussion of the nature 
of culture and symbolic change that has been so invigorated in recent decades. 
Although we have no easy template for the study of symbolic change, large 
progress has been made. From the historical studies of Raymond Williams and 
John Dunn to the systematic study of political cognition of Gamson and 
Modigliani we are learning how to examine the transformation of symbol systems. 
Here we make some brief comments on the relation of ideology and symbolic 
attachments to movements and countermovements. 
First, movements and countermovements are nested in long waves of ideo- 
logy and counter-ideology. Ideologies are nested in class relations and in 
culture. Our definition of social movements rests upon sentiments about change. 
These ideas are rooted in long term views about right action and the relations 
among groups, citizens and the state. The ground for mobilization must be 
prepared. Some of the ground of social movement ideology may be quite remote, 
for instance many modern social movements assume that social relations are 
manipulable. That view rests upon an active, Western view of relations as 
objectifiable and separatable. It is probably not necessary for social move- 
ment analysts to spend much time worrying about those distant assumptions 
- ' V  
undergirding action. On the other hand, movement and countermovement must 
develop ideologies that convince bystanders and authorities of the rightness 
of their view. Social movements have the problem in their nascent stage of 
getting on the agenda and of making their priorities and view of the world 
acceptable to those who think the ideas are strange and wrong. There are a wide 
variety of techniques for doing so. Principles of rhetoric and the social 
psychology of belief systems tell us something about how this occurs, whether 
or not SM cadre and leaders consciously use the principles. 
Countermovements have a different problem. They must "remember the ans- 
wers." Often their leaders and cadre are in the position of defending policies 
whose justifications have receded into the routine grounds. They seem to be 
going backward, their policies justify the status quo and established routines. 
The problem for many countermovements is how to make older symbols relevant 
to newer situations. They must both discredit the ideas of the movement and 
show how older ideologies have relevance to new situations. 
The long waves of ideology and counter-ideology are treated by historians 
of ideas. One point of entre for the sociologist of social movements is to map 
the nexus between idea entrepreneurs and specific SMOs and industry modes. 
An awareness of the long wave of movement ideology also points up another 
issue, the maintenance of social movement and countermovement sentiment under 
repression. It is striking how major ideologies and political values resurge 
when state repression is lifted. One would have thought that the Franco regime, 
with its thirty-five years of dominance, could have wiped out commitment to 
democracy, to socialism and communism. But the end of the regime was followed 
in short order by full blown parties and ideological apparatuses. How many 
generations does it take? How deeply into primary group structure must the 
state intrude in order to eliminate civilizational ideologies, major systems 
of thought and belief about the social structure and possibilities? 
Finally, but related to the last, attention to the long waves of senti- 
- 
merits and symbolS,raises the issue-of how movements resurface over the decades. - - - 
Feminism was strong in the early part of the century, died in the Great 
Depression, and was resurrected in the early 60s (Scharf, 1980). To some 
extent new leaders resurrect old exemplars and issues, recreate, selectively, 
our past to fit present needs. The debate between movement and countermovement 
draws upon the cultural stock, but transforms it. 
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